Rhetoric in the Middle Ages

By Richard McKee

Medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians and philosophers, following the example of Cicero, seldom omit from their treatment of rhetoric some consideration of the subject matter, nature, and end of the art. Long before Cicero rhetoric had become one of the focal points of the differences of philosophic schools, and the practice and application of the art had long wandered from field to field, reflecting, and sometimes even affecting, the complexities of philosophic discussions. Yet rhetoric is treated as a simple verbal discipline, in histories which touch upon it, as the art of speaking well, applied either as it was in Rome to forensic oratory and associated with the interpretation of laws or, more frequently, applied as it was in the Renaissance in the interpretation and use of the works of orators and poets, and associated with or even indistinguishable from poetic and literary criticism. The history of rhetoric as it has been written since the Renaissance is therefore in part the distressing record of the obtuseness of writers who failed to study the classics and to apply rhetoric to literature, and in part the monotonous enumeration of doctrines, or preferably sentences, repeated from Cicero or commentators on Cicero. Scholarly labors have reconstructed only a brief and equivocal history for rhetoric during the Middle Ages. The development consists of slight and unoriginal increments of erudition in the compendia composed from the fourth to the ninth century — which were derived largely from the *De Inventione* of Cicero and the *Ad Herennium* — and in later commentaries and treatises until in the twelfth century they reflect and use doctrines from Quintilian and from the later rhetorical works of Cicero, the *Orator*, the *De Oratore*, and the *Topica*. The sequence of development is fortuitous and even implausible, for the treatment of rhetoric becomes more perfunctory as erudition in the works of rhetoricians increases, and rhetoric disappears abruptly when knowledge of it is at a maximum, particularly from the works of the authors who acknowledge the influence of Cicero and Quintilian. The

1 By way of experimental departure from the customary procedure at meetings of learned societies the following paper will be the subject of discussion at the next meeting of the Mediaeval Academy on April 24, 1942. Rhetoric was chosen as a topic which impinges on many fields of mediaeval study, and an effort is made in the paper to touch, at least, on as many of them as possible. The paper will not be read at the meeting but will be considered in informal panel discussion in which it is hoped all members present at the meeting will participate.
translation of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, and the De Elocutione of Demetrius in the thirteenth century would seem to have had, by this account, no effect comparable to that of the other translations of the century in stimulating interest in its subject; and the return of rhetoric to prominence during the Renaissance is explained only on the supposition that men's minds were turned once more, after a long interval, to literature and life.  

1 Valla, Vives, Ramus, and other Renaissance rhetoricians who treat the history of rhetoric pass over the intermediate period to criticize, refute, and occasionally approve of the doctrines of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius. In early works of erudition and philology the scope of the history of rhetoric is no broader than the scope of controversy. D. G. Morhof makes the transition from Cicero, Quintilian and their predecessors, who are considered in the first nine of the thirty-two paragraphs headed De Scriptoris Rhetoricis in his Polyhistor, Literarius, Philosophicus et Practicus (Lib. vi, cap. 1 [3rd ed., Lubecae, 1732], i, 941–956), to the Renaissance rhetoricians treated in the last twenty-three paragraphs with the remark, 'Nos vero, missis nunc veteribus, ad recentiores sparsim enumerandos progreedimus.' J. Clericus carries the Historia Rhetorica down to the Church Fathers in his Ars Critica (Pars ii, Sectio i, cap. 17 [Leipzig, 1713], i, 396–352). The history of rhetoric has more recently been extended to the Middle Ages, but it is always rhetoric in some particular sense, applied to some particular subject, and the history is usually negative or at least deprecatory. J. B. L. Crevier thus traces the history of rhetoric in education by noting the absence of any provision for rhetoric in the regulations of the University of Paris until the restoration of letters (Histoire de l'Université de Paris [Paris, 1761], i, 299, 307, 376, 479; ii, 450; iv, 190, 243–44, 249, 330, 349, and passim). The pattern of rhetoric had, incidentally, not changed from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century in the important respect that Crevier found little use in his own writings on rhetoric for any authors between the ancients and his contemporaries, and the imperfections of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian are his excuse for writing: 'Aristote me paroit trop philosophe, Ciceron trop orateur, Quintilien trop scholastique' (Rhétorique Française [Paris, 1808], i, xix). E. Norden treats rhetoric primarily in terms of style and is able therefore to dispose of the entire period from the ninth century to the time of Petrarch briefly in terms of the opposition of the study of authors to the study of the liberal arts, of classicism to scholasticism (Die Antike Kunstprosa vom vi. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance [4th ed. Leipzig, 1923], ii, 688–731); cf. the treatment of rhetoric and poetic (ibid., 894–898). According to C. S. Baldwin the fate of rhetoric is determined by shifts in the interrelations of the arts of the trivium: rhetoric was dominant until the fall of Rome, grammar during the Carolingian period, dialectic during the Middle Ages (Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic [New York, 1928], p. 151). Rhetoric was crowded in mediæval education between grammar for boys and dialectic for men, and Baldwin is therefore at pains to find reasons which explain 'why there was no medieval rhetorician who really advanced the study' (ibid., p. 182). The history of rhetoric during the Middle Ages is consequently the account of its misapplications and extensions: poetic is a misapplication of rhetoric to style (ibid., pp. 185 ff., esp. 191–195); the dictamen is a development of rhetoric, but without need of perversion (ibid., pp. 208 ff., esp. 214–215); and preaching in the absence of political and forensic oratory makes use of epideictic or occasional oratory, the third of Aristotle's genera (ibid., pp. 229 ff.). According to P. Abelson (The Seven Liberal Arts, A Study in Medieval Culture [New York, 1906], pp. 58 ff.) rhetoric consisted of a practical training during the Roman period, then it consisted of the technical rules of a science, and finally, when this theoretical and logical form of rhetoric fell into obsolescence, of the practical rules for writing letters and documents. In the account of N. Valois (Guillaume d'Auvergne [Paris, 1880], pp. 224 ff.) rhetoric was taught as a liberal art until the end of the twelfth century and then fell into discredit except as a practical discipline applied to preaching and prayer. The judgment of C. H. Haskins (The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century [Cambridge, Mass., 1928], p. 138) is no less concise in statement: 'Ancient rhetoric was concerned with oratory, mediæval rhetoric chiefly with letter-writing,' and is illustrated with detailed evidence. More simply, if rhetoric is viewed as a form of literary criticism and associated with poetic, the decline of rhetoric is a symptom of the eclipse of the
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There is little reflection in the histories of rhetoric of the differences concerning the subject matter and purpose of rhetoric by which rhetoricians thought to distinguish and oppose their doctrines, and only occasionally and opaquely do some of the consequences of basic philosophic differences appear in the place given to rhetoric in the enumerations and classifications of the arts and sciences. The theoretic presuppositions which underlie the shifts and alterations of rhetorical doctrines are readily made to seem verbal and arbitrary preferences, for in the course of discussion all of the terms are altered in meanings, and the contents and methods of each of the arts are transformed when grammar, rhetoric, poetic, dialectic, and logic change places or are identified one with another, or are distinguished from each other, or are subsumed one under another. Yet the confident readjustments of Renaissance rhetoricians, their redistribution of technical devices among the arts, and their correction of the confusions of the ancients seem no less whimsical and haphazard, if their reasons and criteria are ignored in the repetition of enumerations of the disciplines and their parts. Rhetoricians from Cicero to Ramus have in common a persistent care in defining their art, and it seems plausible that a history of rhetoric traced in terms of its matter and function, as successively specified, might follow the sense of altering definitions, the differentiation of various conceptions of rhetoric itself, and the spread of the devices of rhetoric to subject matters far from those ordinarily ascribed to it. Such a history would not treat an art determined to a fixed subject matter (so conceived rhetoric is usually found to have little or no history, despite much talk about rhetoric and even more use of it, during the Middle Ages) nor on the other hand would it treat an art determined arbitrarily and variously by its place in classifications of the sciences (so conceived the whole scheme and philosophy of the sciences would be uncontrolled in their alterations and therefore empty). The history of rhetoric should have as subject an art which, although it has no special subject matter according to most rhetoricians, nonetheless must be discussed in application to some subject matter: rhetoric is applied to many incommensurate subject matters; it borrows devices from other arts and its technical terms and methods become, without trace of their origin, parts of other arts and sciences; its own devices may be bent back upon themselves in such a way that any part of rhetoric or any matter incidentally involved in it — words and style, character and passion, reason and imagination, the kinds of orations, civil philosophy, practical action — may become basic to the definition of all technical terms and distinctions. Moreover, if the succession of subject matters and functions can be used to reduce the welter of changes in rhetoric to a significant historical sequence, the theories implicated in the shifts of its subject matter will emerge, not merely as philosophic or sophistic disputes, but in concrete application, each at least defensible and each a challenge to the conception of intellectual history as the simple record of the development of a body of knowledge by more or less adequate investigations of a constant subject matter.

I

Three distinct lines of intellectual development during the Middle Ages were decisively determined or strongly influenced in their initial stages by rhetoric: first, and most properly, the tradition of rhetoricians themselves who found their problems assembled and typical answers discussed in the works of Cicero and Quintilian; second, and less obviously, the tradition of philosophers and theologians who found in Augustine a Platonism reconstructed from the Academic and Neoplatonic philosophies (conscientiously reversing the process by which they were derived from Plato’s doctrines) and formulated in terms refurbished and simplified from Cicero’s rhetorical distinctions; and finally, the tradition of logic which passed as ‘Aristotelian’ yet which followed Aristotle only in the treatment of terms and propositions, and Cicero in the treatment of definitions and principles. Whatever the estimate critics and historians are disposed to make of Cicero’s achievement, originality, and consistency, his choices and emphases fixed the influence and oriented the interpretation of ancient thought, Greek as well as Latin, at the beginning of the Middle Ages and again in the Renaissance, and we today are far from having freed ourselves from the consequences of that long tradition in scholarship, criticism, or taste. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance many of the oppositions and agreements of theology and dialectic, no less than problems internal to each, are stated in language borrowed from or influenced by rhetoric, and reflect theories by which rhetoricians had in antiquity opposed philosophers and logicians; surprising parallels arise in them as well as in other arts and sciences, expressed in language familiar to the rhetorician; innovations and discoveries are made which seem to follow the dictation of nature if their pattern of statement is ignored; and mere equivocations are pursued into interminable and recurrent verbal disputes.

The rhetoricians of the Middle Ages followed Cicero or suggestions found in his works when they discussed civil philosophy as the subject matter of rhetoric, or divided that subject matter according to the three kinds of oratory — deliberative, judicial, demonstrative — or when they sought to determine it more generally by means of the distinction between propositum and causa (or thesis and hypothesis as the Greek terms were Latinized), or by consideration of the characteristics of controversies and the constitutions (or status) of questions. Moreover, they could learn, even from the De Inventione, that there had been controversy on most of these points, and in particular the brief history of three views concerning the matter of rhetoric — Gorgias holding that it is all things, Aristotle dividing it into three kinds proper to the three kinds of oratory, and Hermagoras distinguishing causes, which are specific to persons, and questions, which are without such specification — supplied the arguments by which to dissent from, as well as those to support, Cicero’s version of Aristotelian’s solution. Major altera-

1 Cf. Cicero, De Inventione i. 4. 5.: ‘Sed antequam de praeceptis oratoris dicimus, videtur dicensum de genere ipsius artis, de officio, de fine, de materia, de partibus.’ After determining that its genus is ‘civilis scientia,’ its officium ‘dicere adposizitae ad persuasione,’ and its finis ‘persuadere dictione,’ Cicero defines the matter of all arts, including the art of rhetoric (ibid. 5. 7.): ‘Materiam artis eam dicimus, in qua omnis ars et ea facultas, quae conficitur ex arte, versatur.’
2 Ibid. 5. 7.–7. 9. Cf. Ibid. 9. 12. for illustration of the process by which basic terms are altered and
tions in the contents and doctrines of rhetoric follow on these differences in matter particularly when they are joined to a little erudition, such as might be derived from study of the points of difference between the Ad Herennium and the De Inventione, or from the information supplied by Fortunatianus, concerning figures and the Greek technical terms of rhetoric, or finally from Quintilian’s orderly enumerations of divergent views and his statement and rectification of inconsistencies attributed to Cicero. Even apart from the influence of theology, and before the influence of dialectic was felt, the remnants of controversial differences were preserved in rhetoric itself.

The influence of rhetoric on Augustine was by reaction and assimilation; he differentiated two eloquences and two arts, much as Plato had proved rhetoric to be a pseudo art in the Gorgias and yet had illustrated the method of the true rhetoric based on dialectic in the Phaedrus. Augustine was first attracted to philosophy by Cicero’s Hortensius which he encountered in the course of his rhetorical studies, and he was put off in his further attempt to combine philosophy with the name of Christ by the contrast of the Scriptural and Ciceronian styles. That stumbling block was finally removed in part by the aid of a rhetorical device which he learned from Ambrose’s preaching — the analogical method of interpreting Scripture — and although thereafter he refused to answer questions concerning Cicero’s Orator and De Oratore, on the grounds that it was a task unworthy of a bishop distracted with ecclesiastical cares, his statement of Christian doctrine was in the terms of Cicero sublimated to new meanings and transformed to new uses. When he wishes to enumerate the questions basic to all inquiry, he resorts to Cicero’s three ‘constitutions of causes’ — whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort; and when he enumerates the methods to be used in treating Scriptural questions, they turn out to be two of Cicero’s five parts of rhetoric — discovery and statement; moreover, these two sets of questions seem to him exhaustive and all problems and doctrines turn, as in the manuals

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1 Cf. Institutio Oratoria iii. 5. 4. ff. for an excellent statement of the problems involved in rhetorical ‘questions,’ and the disputes concerning thesis and hypothesis, and esp. 14–15 for the development of Cicero’s doctrine. For a brief summary of some of the characteristic statements of the definition and end of rhetoric cf. ibid. ii. 15; for disputes concerning its matter, ibid. 21. Or again, in illustration of the bending back of rhetorical distinctions, what one man holds to be the ‘parts of rhetoric’ another treats as the ‘work of the orator’ (ibid. iii. 3. 11. ff.) the two positions are taken respectively by Cicero, De Inventione i. 7. 9, and Fortunatianus, Ars Rhetorica i. 1 (Halm, Rhetores Latini Minores — henceforth cited Halm — [Leipzig, 1863], p. 81).

2 Confessions iii. 3. 6–5. 9; Patrologia Latina (henceforth cited PL) 32, 685–686.

3 Ibid. v. 13. 23 and vi. 4. 5–6; PL 32, 717 and 721–722. Cf. also the conversion of Victorinus the rhetorician and the effect of salus and fides on his rhetoric, ibid. viii. 2. 5; PL 32, 751.

4 Epistola CXVIII ad Dioscorum i. 2 and v. 34; PL 33, 482–483 and 448.
of rhetoric, on 'things' or on 'signs.' This rhetorical language has, however, been adapted to the statement of a theology: discovery has been qualified as discovery of 'what should be understood' and statement as statement of 'what has been understood,' with the result that the classification of signs and their uses is dependent, as it had not been in rhetoric, on the classification of things. In the Rhetoric in the Middle Ages the first three books are concerned with discovery, the fourth with statement. The treatment of discovery requires, in the first book, the distinction of things into those which as final ends are loved or enjoyed (frui) and those which as intermediate ends are used (uti) for further ends, and, under the former head, a theological inquiry into the attributes of God and divine things; treatment of the nature of things is supplemented, in the second book, by a philological inquiry into the nature of words as that problem bears on the Scriptures and the arts and institutions of the pagans; and finally, in the third book, the inquiry into means of removing verbal ambiguities requires appeal to two sets of rules, grammatical rules applied to the manner of statement, and rhetorical rules to determine the circumstances of fact. The treatment of statement in the final book is therefore concerned not so much with the precepts of rhetoric, although some precepts can be found from analysis of the fashion in which the three styles of Cicero are applied to their appropriate matters by 'ecclesiastical orators,' as with an eloquence in which the words are supplied by the things and by wisdom itself and the speaker is unlearnedly wise. The judgment expressed by Cicero at the beginning of the De Inventione that wisdom without eloquence is of little benefit to the state, and eloquence without wisdom a great danger, is transformed, when Augustine quotes it, by a dialectical doubling of all the terms. The wisdom and eloquence of the world are to be contrasted to eternal wisdom and eloquence, for not only are there two kinds of things, temporal and divine, but two kinds of words, the external words instituted and used by men, which have no correspondence to things except by designation and no

1 Confessions x. 9. 16–10. 17; PL 32, 786. Cf. Cicero, Orator 14. 45: 'Nam quoniam, quicquid est quod in controversia aut in contentione versetur, in eo aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit ququeritur: sitne, signis; quid sit, definitionibus; quale sit, recti pravique partibus — quibus ut uti possit orator, non ille volgaris sed hic excellens, a propriis personis et temporibus, si potest, avocat controversiam.'

The context and application of the questions is rhetorical in the Confessions, but cf. De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, 18 (PL 40, 15): 'Ideoque etiam cum veritas quaeritur, plus quam tria genera questionum esse non possunt; utrum omnino sit, utrum hoc an aliud sit, utrum approbandum improbandumve sit.' The tendency of these questions toward generalization beyond their specifically rhetorical meanings is assisted by some of the names attached to them: the pseudo-Augustine calls them 'rational or logical' questions (De Rhetorica 9 [Halm 142]); Martianus Capella calls them 'principal status' (De Rhetorica 6 [Halm 455]); Clodian 'rational status' (Ars Rhetorica [Halm 590]). A fourth question or constitution or status is added by Hermagoras, rejected by Cicero and Quintilian, and mentioned by the pseudo-Augustine and Clodian. Concerning the variety and evolution of questions (or status as he prefers to call them), cf. Quintilian iii. 6. 29–85; his own decision is presented as one prescribed by nature and coincident with the doctrine of Cicero (ibid. 80): 'Credendum est igitur quum auctoritatem secutus est Cicero, tria esse, quae in omni disputazione quaerantur, an sit, quid sit, quale sit? quod ipsa nobis etiam natura praeessrit.' For Augustine's enumeration of scriptural methods and problems, cf. De Doctrina Christiana i. 1–2; PL 34, 19–20.

2 Ibid. iii. 4. 8, and 12. 18; PL 34, 68 and 72–73.

3 Ibid. iv. 1. 1–7. 11; PL 34, 89–94.
controllable influence on our thought except by the context of other words, and
the internal words by which a master speaking within us teaches the truth.1
Whether things be treated as signs or signs as things, only the eternal meanings
and realities are important; knowledge of temporal things and of the arts is
chiefly useful for the interpretation of the language and symbolism of Scripture,
and the sacraments are signs adapted to the mutability of human sensibilities
but immutable in their significance of the changeless things of God.2 Once account
is taken of the distinction of things and words into those which are temporal and
those which are changeless, the influence of rhetoric is discernible in many
traits of the Augustinian tradition: in the analogical interpretation of Scripture
and in the numerous mediaeval encyclopedias prepared to facilitate such inter-
pretation (for words are signs which are useful less to designate things than to
express truths and persuade minds, and things therefore are useful to interpret
signs, not signs to interpret things);3 in the literal interpretation in which ap-
parently contradictory texts were reconciled in canon law and theology by use of
the rhetorician's 'circumstances' of statement, that is, by consideration of 'who'
said it, 'where, when, why, how, with what assistance';4 in the organization of
theological problems according to the distinction of things and signs; and in the
place of rhetoric after dialectic in the enumeration of the liberal arts (since it
supplies the means of stating truths once they have been discovered) instead of
before dialectic as in the enumeration of an opposed tradition (since it achieves
only probability and persuasion, but falls short of truth).5

The discussion of logic during the Middle Ages may be divided into four
periods: during the first period the elements of logic were learned from simple

1 De Magistro 3. 5–6 and 11. 36–12. 46; PL 32, 1197–98 and 1215–20. Cf. the excellent statement of
the relation of language to thought by E. Gilson, Introduction à l'Étude de Saint Augustin (Paris,
1929), pp. 87–103. Augustine's conception of rhetoric is developed most fully in the De Doctrina
Christiana, De Ordine, De Catechizandis Rudibus, and Contra Cresconium. Cf. also J. Žurék, 'De S.
Aurelii praeceptis rhetoricis,' Dissertationes Philologae Vindobonenses (Vienna, 1905), viii, 69–109;
M. Comeau, La Rhétorique de Saint Augustin d'après le Tractatus in Ioannis (Paris, 1930); G.
Combès, Saint Augustin et la Culture Classique (Paris, 1987), esp. pp. 49–56 where true eloquence is
distinguished from the oratorical art; H.-I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique
(Paris, 1938), esp. pp. 507–540 on Christian eloquence. The rhetoric of Cicero was moral and political
in its applications, and the influence of rhetoric extended to political doctrine. The differentiation of
things according to ends loved and means used had already entered Christian ethics in Ambrose's
De Officiis Ministrorum which was based on the distinctions of Cicero's De Officiis, and Cicero's rhe-
torically conceived political theory supplies, by virtue of the same distinction, the terminology for
Augustine's discussion of the city of God as well as the elements of the terrestrial city to which it is
contrasted.

2 Epistola CXXXVIII ad Marcellinum i. 7; PL 38, 527: 'Nimis autem longum est, conveniinter
disputare de varietate signorum, quae cum ad res divinas pertinent, Sacramenta appellantur. Sicut
autem non ideo mutabilis homo, quia mane aliud, aliud vesperae; illud hoc mense, illud alio; non hoc
isto anno quod illo: ita non ideo mutabilis Deus, quia universi saeculi priore volumine aliud, aliud
posteriore sibi iussit offerri, quo conveniinter significationes ad doctrinam religionis saluberrimam
pertinentes, per mutabilia tempora sine ulla sui mutatione disponeret.'

3 Cf. Gilson, o.c., pp. 151–153.

4 De Doctrina Christiana iii. 12. 18–20. 41; PL 34, 72–81.

5 For the fashion in which rhetoric follows and supplements dialectic according to Augustine, cf.
ibid. ii. 35. 53–57. 55; PL 34, 60–61; De Ordine ii. 18. 38; PL 32, 1018.
treatises like the pseudo-Augustine’s *Principia Dialecticae* and *Categoriae Decem* (which Alcuin recommended to Charlemagne as Augustine’s translation of Aristotle’s *Categories*) or the sections on dialectic in such handbooks as those of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville; during the second period, after the curriculum instituted by Gerbert at the end of the tenth century, the basis of instruction in dialectic was broadened to include the works and translations of Boethius, among them two of the six books of Aristotle’s *Organon*, which together acquired the traditional name of the Old Logic; during the third period, the translation of the remaining four books in the twelfth century set up the New Logic, constituted of the *Introduction* of Porphyry, the *Organon* of Aristotle, and the *Six Principles* of Gilbert de la Porrée, yet the authority of the Old Logic continued strong, for the contemporaries of John of Salisbury found the *Posterior Analytics*, which treats of the principles of scientific demonstration, difficult or even unintelligible, and indeed the first important commentary on that work was written in the thirteenth century by Robert Grosseteste, while as late as the fourteenth century William of Ockham prepared an *Expositio aurea et admodum utilis super Artem Veterem*; and finally during the fourth period, the discussion of logic is determined less by Aristotle’s *Organon* than by the *Summulae* written in the thirteenth century by Petrus Hispanus, Lambert of Auxerre, and William of Shyreswood. The extent of the influence of rhetoric on the development of logic may be judged from the fact that — although Aristotle’s logic is characterized not merely by the schemata of terms, propositions, and syllogisms set forth in the first three books of the *Organon*, but even more by the differentiation of proof, in accordance with the principles on which it depends, into three kinds: scientific or demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical, which are expounded in the last three books, the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* — only the first three books had much influence until the thirteenth century, while principles were treated by devices which Aristotle used in rhetoric and dialectic, and even after the thirteenth century scientific method was in constant danger of being assimilated to dialectic, the *Posterior Analytics* to the *Topics*.

The early treatments of dialectic in the handbooks and encyclopedias run through a familiar sequence of subjects: the predicables of Porphyry, the categories of Aristotle, a briefer treatment of propositions in which the testimony of Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* is mixed in small doses with that of the treatise by the same name attributed to Apuleius, an exposition of the categorical syllogism derived from the pseudo-Apuleius and of the hypothetical syllogism derived from the rhetorician Marius Victorinus, and finally, in place of Aristotle’s principles of demonstration, sections on definition and on ‘topics’ or ‘common-

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1 John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* iv. 6 (ed. C. C. J. Webb, Oxford, 1929), p. 171: ‘Deinde hec utentium raritate iam fere in desuetudinem abit, eo quod demonstrationis usus uix apud solos mathematicos est; et in his fere, apud geometras dumtaxat; sed et huius quoque discipline non est celebris usus apud nos, nisi forte in tractu Hiberno uel confinio Africæ.’ In contrast to his brief and almost flippant treatment of the *Posterior Analytics*, John devotes more than half of the third book (iii. 5–10, pp. 199–164) to praise of the utility of the *Topics*. 
places' derived from the Greek rhetoricians by way of Cicero and the lost works of Marius Victorinus. So direct is the descent of the principles of demonstration from rhetoric that Cassiodorus closes his consideration of the art of dialectic, having treated of topics, with 'atechnical' arguments (which form part of the Topics of Cicero, but figure in the Rhetoric and not the Topics of Aristotle) and memory (which, although one of the traditional five parts of rhetoric, is common, according to Cassiodorus, to orators, dialecticians, poets, and jurists), while Isidore supplements his statement of topics with a section on opposites derived from Cicero. The basic pattern of this logic was not crucially altered by the return in the second period to the more extensive logical works of Boethius. 'Dialectic' is not distinct from 'logic' in the tradition of the Old Logic; rather dialectic or logic is divided on the authority of Cicero into two parts, one (called 'analytic' by the Greeks according to Boethius) concerned with judgment, the other (called 'topic' by the Greeks) concerned with discovery. Boethius translated and wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation, but he also translated and wrote two commentaries on the Isagoge or Introduction of the Neo-Platonist Porphyry which expounds, as introduction to the Categories, the predicables treated by Aristotle in his Topics, and this dialectical treatment of 'the five words' appeared thereafter, even when the influence of Boethius was slight, in mediaeval, Renaissance, and early modern treatments of Aristotle’s logic and editions of his Organon. Instead of Aristotle’s treatment of syllogisms, mediaeval philosophers had, until the twelfth century, Boethius’ essays On the Categorical Syllogism (in which the doctrine of Aristotle is modified by the doctrines of Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Porphyry), On the Hypothetical Syllogism (in which the authority of Theophrastus and Eudemus is invoked for seeking necessary premisses in the forms of propositions rather than in the nature of things), and On Division (which goes back to the 'peripatetic' tradition according to the opening sentence of the essay, but cites explicitly only Andronicus, Plotinus, and Andronicus).
Porphyry, for treatment of a 'scientia dividendi' in which Aristotle himself placed little store). The *De Definitione* which went under his name is by Marius Victorinus, and it supplies one more channel for the influence of Cicero and rhetoric. Finally, instead of a treatment of the differences of demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical principles and proofs, Boethius left two works which had the effect, during the Middle Ages and increasingly during the Renaissance, of translating the problem of distinguishing principles into the problem of discovering arguments or things: his *Commentary on the Topics* of Cicero and his treatise in four books *On Topical Differences*, in which the topical schemes or common-places of Themistius and Cicero are set forth and reduced to a single classification. With the advent of the New Logic in the third period, during the twelfth century, however, logic was distinguished from dialectic, and rhetoric became the counterpart of dialectic, although logic continued to be divided into judgment and discovery. Finally, during the fourth period, in the *Summulae* of the thirteenth century, the emphasis is again on the topics, as it is also in the reaction against logic during the Renaissance, when the *Topics* of Cicero and of Boethius were once more used (as John the Scot had used topics) as inspiration for a scientific method of discovering, not arguments, but things, and the scholastic logic was viewed as a verbal discipline inferior in precision and practical effectiveness to these devices of rhetoric.

The treatment of rhetoric, in turn, showed the effects of this extension of the devices of rhetoric to logic, since it became important to contrast rhetoric and dialectic when both rhetoricians and dialecticians made use of 'places' for purposes of discovery. Paradoxically, in this tradition in which the methods of rhetoric were similar to those of dialectic, rhetoric was subordinated to dialectic, while in the tradition in which rhetoric was criticized and then transformed to theological uses, dialectic was subordinated to rhetoric. The fourth book of Boethius' *On Topical Differences*, which treats of the differences between dialectical and rhetorical places, was used as a textbook of rhetoric in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and two short treatises devoted to rhetorical places passed under his name, the *Speculatio de Rhetoricae Cognitione* (which is more probably a compilation derived from Book IV of *De Differentiis Topicis* than an independent work by Boethius) and the *Locorum Rhetoricorum Distinctio*. Boethius finds the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric in their matter, use, and end: the matter of dialectic is 'theses,' that of rhetoric 'hypotheses,' and thesis and hypothesis are related as two kinds of 'questions,' the one universal, the other

3. Boethius refers to translations he has made of other books of the *Organon*, but no evidence has been found in mediaeval literature of their influence prior to the twelfth century; cf. C. H. Haskins, 'Versions of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*,' *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), pp. 231 ff. For the rhetorical character and effects of the *De Differentiis Topicis* cf. Prantl, *o.c.*, I, 720–722.
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particularized to circumstances; dialectic uses interrogation and response, and its arguments are set forth in syllogisms, rhetoric uses continuous speech involving enthymemes; the end of dialectic is to force what one wishes from an adversary, that of rhetoric to persuade a judge.1 Boethius takes over the early position of Cicero, as expressed in the De Inventione, concerning matter, but the whole question of end, function, and matter is raised in the context of a considerably longer list of questions and in that context the other answers have changed. Boethius asks no fewer than nine questions about rhetoric: its genus, species, matter, parts, instrument, the parts of the instrument, the work and duty of the orator and his end. The genus of rhetoric is no longer ‘civil science’ (as it was for Cicero) but ‘faculty’ (much as Aristotle had held it to be a διάνοια rather than a science). The matter of the faculty is all things suited to discourse, which, as Boethius puts it, is almost equivalent to the ‘civil question’; this matter of discourse is indeterminate until it is given specific form by the ends of rhetoric: the ‘civil question’ is made into a judicial ‘cause’ when the end considered is the just; into a deliberative ‘cause’ when the end is the useful or the honorable; into a demonstrative ‘cause’ when the end is the good. It is, as Isidore later observed, an elusive question, in which the genus of an art can be transmuted into its matter, but that strange difference is one of the slight remnants of the difference between Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric and that of Cicero and the rhetoricians, and from that remnant in Boethius’ questions, mediaeval commentators were to reconstruct, with slowly increasing erudition, the full specifications of the old opposition.

II

These were not technical questions which were discussed by a few learned men, but distinctions which entered into all parts of mediaeval culture and life. Christianity had grown up in the environment of a culture which was preponderantly rhetorical: indeed the chief differences between Greek and Latin Christianity may be derived from the difference between the Latin rhetoric of the Republic and early Empire (in which the arts and sciences had been put to the aid of rhetoric and civil philosophy had all but been reduced to the art of forensic pleading) and the Greek rhetoric of the Empire (in which philosophy itself had been displaced by display or epideictic rhetoric in the guise of sophistic, the rules of oratory had become the canons of literature, and Plato’s and Aristotle’s comparison of rhetoric and medicine had been made into a scientific method which rhetoric shared with medicine).2 Since many of the early converts who first wrote

1 De Differentiis Topicius iv; PL 64, 1205–1206. Cf. ibid. i; PL 64, 1177.
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on Christian doctrine had been professional rhetoricians before their conversions, the rhetorical distinctions which they used in the statement of their problems and the organization of their works emerged often as doctrinal differences and empirical observations in later speculation on their statements. This emergence of rhetoric in the materials of discussion in all fields brought new questions into the technical disputes of the art. The numerous technical distinctions which had entered the apparatus and discussion of rhetoric took on applications, which echo or anticipate many of the positions of philosophers, proper to each of the three conceptions of rhetoric distinguishable in threefold opposition in the shifting materials to which rhetoric is applied.

Until the coming of the New Logic in the twelfth century the pattern of that opposition is relatively simple: the rhetorician who professed to treat of subject matters accessible to the 'common notions' of the mind without need of technical competence, found himself opposed on the one hand by theologians who had learned from Augustine to use the distinction between words and things both to attack the rhetoric of the schools and to practise a rhetoric concerned with divine eloquence and divine things, and on the other hand by rhetoricians who had learned from Boethius to use the distinction between thesis and hypothesis to limit rhetoric to probable reasoning concerning specifically delimited questions subordinate to the general questions of dialectic. To the Augustinian the excessive use or extension of rhetoric no less than that of dialectic was suspect; to the peripatetic follower of Boethius limitation or criticism of dialectic, whether from the point of view of theology or of rhetoric, was an attack on the use of reason; and to the rhetorician as such, limitation of rhetoric by the laws of logic or theol-

Philostratus includes in his Lives of the Sophists some of the ancient philosophers who approximated the rhetorical style of the sophists, but he distinguished philosophy from sophistic (i. 481) since philosophers merely set snares for knowledge by their questioning, but asserted that they had no sure knowledge, whereas sophists of the old school professed knowledge of that whereof they spoke. Philostratus' enthusiastic account of the sophists of the Empire is vivid indication of the spread and importance of epideictic rhetoric; its influence is likewise to be remarked in the Eastern Church, particularly among the Cappadocian fathers: cf. E. Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa ii, 529 ff. and 550 ff.; T. C. Burgess, 'Epideictic Literature,' University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology iii (1902), 89–251; L. Méridier, L'Influence de la seconde sophistique sur l'oeuvre de Grégoire de Nyuse (Paris, 1906); M. Guignet, Les Procédés Epistolaires de St. Grégoire de Niasianz (Paris, 1911); T. E. Ameringer, The Stylistic Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom (Washington, 1921); J. M. Campbell, The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Style of the Sermons of St. Basil the Great (Washington, 1922); A. Boulanger, Aelius Aristide et et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie au ii siècle de notre ère (Paris, 1923). The crossing lines of rhetoric and medicine are apparent in Eunapius' Lives of the Philosophers; cf. particularly his accounts of Zeno of Cyprus, Magnus, Oribasius, and Ionicus (497–499). Magnus made a happy combination of rhetoric and medicine by persuading the patients of other doctors that they had not been cured and then restoring them to health, apparently also by talk and questions; Ionicus was master of philosophy and medicine as well as the arts of rhetoric and poetry. Cf. P. H. and E. A. De Lacy, Philodemus: On Methods of Inference (Philadelphia, 1941), pp. 130 ff., where the relations between medicine and rhetoric are discussed in terms of an 'empirical' or 'conjectural' method.

1 Cyprian (cf. Jerome, De Viris Illustribus 67; PL 25, 714), Arnobius (cf. Jerome, Chronicon ad annum 329; PL 27, 677–676), Lactantius (ibid., ad annum 319; PL 27, 669–670), Augustine (Confessions iv. 2; PL 32, 698–694). Most of the other early Christian writers in the West, even those who had not been teachers of rhetoric, had studied the art as part of their education.
ogy was unwarranted restriction of the scope of reason and visionary neglect of the practical exigencies of the problems of law and morals. The simple lines of this opposition appear even in the early discussions of rhetoric, and they are preserved after the appearance of the New Logic, beneath the surface of the more intricate distinctions made necessary by the Aristotelian differentiation of logic from dialectic, poetic, sophistic, and rhetoric. These three main positions, taken throughout the Middle Ages with respect to rhetoric, may be marked off into four historical stages sharply distinguished by the authorities on which the discussion of the arts was successively based: a first stage extending to about the end of the tenth century when the chief authorities were the pseudo-Augustine, Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore; a second period extending through the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth century dominated by Cicero, Boethius, and the Old Logic; a third period comprising the latter part of the twelfth century and the greater part of the thirteenth century in which the New Logic became to some degree effective and was applied after a manner in the interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus; and finally the fourteenth century and the Renaissance in which Aristotle and the Greek rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius all had increasing influence.

During the first period rhetoric was concerned — on the authority of Hermagoras, Cicero and Boethius, Fortunatianus, Augustine and Victorinus, and all the even more derivative authorities that depended on them — with civil philosophy. According to Cassiodorus, 'The art of rhetoric is, as the masters of secular letters teach, the science of speaking well in civil questions,' and that definition is repeated in almost the same words by Isidore, Alcuin, and Rhabanus Maurus. The occasion of the dialogue with Charlemagne in which Alcuin’s doctrine is stated is a request made by the emperor for information concerning the art, since he thinks it ridiculous for one whose daily occupation is with civil questions to be ignorant of the precepts of the art; the dialogue, moreover, is frankly moral not only in its traditional title, On Rhetoric and the Virtues, but in purpose, since the transition from rhetoric to the virtues is accomplished by recognition that this 'sermocinandi ratio' which is applied to civil cases and secular business must be
supplemented by the other virtues. Yet within this broad agreement among rhetoricians that rhetoric is concerned with civil questions, there are numerous differences of statement, which sometimes lead to changes in the devices thought proper to rhetoric and which seem often to entail major philosophic differences. The chief of these is the difference between the position (which seems to go back to Hermagoras and for which Fortunatianus is sometimes given as authority) which treats civil philosophy in terms of the 'common notions' of mankind and therefore undertakes to differentiate the subject matter of rhetoric in terms of the questions treated, that is, the kinds of theses and hypotheses, and the position (which goes back to Cicero) which finds the subject matter of rhetoric in the three genera, deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial. The former has the effect of emphasizing the common bases of rhetoric in human knowledge while turning analyses to the peculiarities of the questions that can be asked, the other the effect of centering on the common qualities of the subject matter and directing inquiry to the peculiarities and virtues of the orator. The problems of rhetoric arise largely in the mixtures of the two traditions. Cassiodorus, citing Fortunatianus, defines civil questions as those which fall within the common conception of the mind, that is, which any one can understand when it is a question of the equitable and the good; Sulpitius Victor as those which are proper to no art but common to the opinion of all; Alcuin as those learned questions which can be conceived by the natural power of the mind.1 Victorinus on the other hand divides the possible matter of rhetoric into two kinds: that with which the art operates (ubi fit), namely deliberative, demonstrative, judicial, and that from which the art is formed (unde fit), namely, the arguments which contribute the matter of those three kinds, then limits the consideration of rhetoric to the former, and refutes Hermagoras’ doctrine of thesis and hypothesis in favor of the Aristotelian and Ciceronian doctrine of the three genera.2 Martianus Capella repeats this differentiation of two kinds of matter but goes on to the exposition of theses and hypotheses, confining his disapproval to a remark concerning the extremely subtle reasons of some of the sectaries of rhetoric who hold that all rhetorical questions are general or theses.3 The difference is between a tendency to make distinctions in terms of a subject matter and arguments suited to it and a tendency to make distinctions, often indeed the same distinctions, in terms of the orator and his problems of discovering and stating arguments. The former emphasis tends to intellectualize the art and change its orientation to a subject matter and its peculiarities into problems of inquiry and understanding, as when Sulpitius Victor, having limited rhetoric to the civil question and having divided the civil question into two parts, thesis and hypothesis, finds three duties for the orator: understanding, discovery, and disposition (the first of which was neglected by Cicero, but adequately treated by the Greeks) and then three genera of causes in the place of those long customary: the ethical, pathetic, and judicial. The latter emphasis leads to a series of questions, which were much discussed during the

1 Institutiones ii. 2. 1. p. 97; cf. Fortunatianus, i. 1. (Halm 81) and the pseudo-Augustine (De Rhetorica 4 [Halm 139]) who supplies the Greek term κωφος ένοια suggestive of stoic origins. Sulpitius Victor, Institutiones Oratoriae (Halm 314) and Alcin, De Rhetorica et de Virtutibus 3 (Halm 526).

2 Fabius Laurentius Victorinus 5 (Halm 174–177).

3 Martianus Capella 5 (Halm 454).
Middle Ages, concerning the relation of morals and eloquence, concerning the
relation of art and wisdom, concerning the definition of rhetoric as a virtue or an
art or a discipline.\(^1\) Rhetoric was to come into conflict with dialectic as a conse-
quence of this tendency, as it was to come into conflict with theology as a con-
sequence of its tendency to annex the problems of morals and the interpretation
of Scripture. Since its discipline was gradually limited by the transfer of the
commonplaces, definition, and finally proof — even in the rhetorical formulations
they had received from Cicero, Victorinus, and Boethius — to the domain of
dialectic, and since its subject matter was limited by the transfer of moral and
political questions to theology, rhetoric entered into a second period during which
it developed along three separate lines: as a part of logic, or as the art of stat-
ing truths certified by theology, or as a simple art of words.

III

The subordination of rhetoric to logic was accomplished usually in terms of the
greater particularity of its subject matter, its concern with hypotheses rather
than theses; and the terms of the discussion of the relation of rhetoric to dialectic
were borrowed from Boethius. The doctrine is expressed, however, before the
appearance of Boethius in the curriculum of the schools. According to Isidore of
Seville, logic (Isidore adds that the Greek term \(\lambda\gamma\omicron\omicron\nu\) means ‘rational’) has two
parts, dialectic and rhetoric.\(^2\) John the Scot omits grammar and rhetoric from his
treatise *On the Division of Nature* first because many philosophers think they are
parts of dialectic, second from considerations of brevity, and finally because,
unlike dialectic, grammar and rhetoric do not treat of the nature of things but
either of words significant by convention or of special causes and persons.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Sulpitius Victor, *Institutiones Oratoriae* 4 and 6 (Halm 315, 316). Cato’s definition of the orator
as *vir bonus dicendi peritus* (Quintilian xii. 1.; Seneca, *Controversiarum liber* i. Praef. 9) was frequently
repeated before the Carolingian period — by Fortunatianus, Victorinus, Cassiodorus, Isidore (Halm
81, 177, 498, 507) — and one of the favorite etymologies of ‘art’ derived it from the Greek word for
virtue. In the twelfth century Aristotle’s authority (cited from the Categories) is used to deny that
rhetoric is a virtue (cf. Abailard, *Dialogus* [PL 178, 1052]; Hermannus, *Epitome Theologiae Christianae*
[PL 178, 1750]; *Sententiae Parisienses* [ed. A. Landgraf, *Ecrits Théologiques de l’École d’Abélard,
Louvain, 1934, p. 52]). In the thirteenth century Aristotle’s authority (cited from the *Nicomachean
Ethics*) could be quoted to place it, together with the other arts, among the intellectual virtues. In the
Renaissance one of the chief grounds for Ramus’ violent criticism of Quintilian is found in his tend-
ency to identify rhetoric with morals (cf. P. Ramus, *Rhetoricae Distinctiones in Quintilianum* [Paris,
1559]).

\(^2\) De *Differentiis Rerum* c. 39; PL 83, 93–94.

\(^3\) De *Divisione Naturae* v. 4; PL 122, 869–870: ‘Primum quidem, quia ipsae duae artes veluti qua-
dam membra Dialecticae multis philosophis non incongrue existimantur. Deinde brevitatibus occasione.
Postremo, quod non de rerum natura tractare videntur, sed vel de regulis humanae vocis, quam non
secundum naturam, sed secundum consuetudinem loquentium subsestere Aristoteles cum suis sec-
taboribus approbat, vel de causis atque personis specialibus, quod longe a natura rerum distat. Nam
dum Rhetorica de communibus locis, qui ad naturam rerum pertinent, tractare nititur, non suas, sed
Dialecticae arripit partes.’ Rhetoric is limited to hypotheses or finite questions determined by the
seven circumstances, while the common conceptions of the mind have become the property of dia-
lectic; cf. *ibid.* i. 27; PL 122, 475: ‘Rhetorica est finitam causam persona, materia, occasione, qualitate,
loco, tempore, facultate discutienis copiose atque ornate disciplina; breviterque definiri potest,
Rhetorica est finitae causae septem periochis sagax et copiosa disciplina. Dialectica est communium
animi conceptionum rationabilium diligens investigatrixque disciplina.’
The pseudo-Rhabanus Maurus was one of the philosophers who divided logic into three parts: grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic\(^1\) and Remigius of Auxerre divides philosophers into four kinds: dialecticians, rhetoricians, sophists who always come to false conclusions, and jurists who dispute concerning the status of law.\(^2\) Gerbert, who used all the dialectical works and translations of Boethius in his teaching at Rheims and Paris (including Cicero’s *Topics*, which, like Cassiodorus, he thought Cicero had translated from the Greek, and the *On Definition* of Marius Victorinus), likewise considered dialectic and rhetoric parts of logic, and taught rhetoric after dialectic.\(^3\) Fulbert, finally, who restored studies at Chartres in the eleventh century and who knew, in addition to the *De Inventione* and the *Ad Herennium*, Victorinus’ commentary on Cicero and the two treatises on rhetorical places attributed to Boethius, has left twenty-one verses on the differences between rhetoric and dialectic: they are the three differences Boethius found between the matters, uses, and ends of the arts.\(^4\)

The transition to the third period in this tradition of rhetoric determined relative to dialectic, is accomplished when the increased influence, or at least the increased repute, of the New Logic led to separation of scientific or demonstrative proof from probable proof and to the location of rhetoric with dialectic under the latter. It is a gradual transition, dependent on increase of erudition in logic as much as in rhetoric. In the comprehensive collection of texts in the liberal arts prepared by Thierry of Chartres under the title *Heptateuchon* about 1141, all of Aristotle’s *Organon* except the *Posterior Analytics* and the second book of the *Prior Analytics* appears, while under rhetoric are included (in addition to the *De Inventione*, the *Ad Herennium* and Martianus Capella — the traditional sources of rhetoric — and Cicero’s *Topics* which with Boethius’ *De Differentiis Topicis* is classified under dialectic) only Cicero’s *De Partitione Oratoria* and Julius Severianus’ *Precepts on the art of rhetoric*.\(^5\) Yet Thierry of Chartres wrote a commentary on the *De Inventione* in which a history of rhetoric is reconstructed to explain the opening paragraph of that work as a refutation of Plato and Aristotle: Plato had argued that rhetoric was no art, Aristotle that it was an art but a bad art, while Cicero contends against both that it is a good art.\(^6\) A short Preface and

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3. The sequence of studies, as directed by Gerbert, were: first, dialectic, which included the *Isagoge* of Porphyry (with Boethius’ commentary), the *Categories* and *On Interpretation* of Aristotle, the *Topics* (translated by Cicero and with Boethius’ commentary), Boethius’ *On Topical Differences*, *On Categorical Syllogisms*, *On Hypothetical Syllogisms*, *On Definitions*, *On Divisions*; second, as preparation for rhetoric, the poets; third, rhetoric; finally, sophistic. He includes the entire program under the term ‘logic.’ Richer, *Historiae*, iii, 44 ff. (ed. G. H. Pertz, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, t. v, *Scriptores*, iii, 617).
6. Fragmentum Scholiastae Inediti ad Ciceronem de Inventione Rhetorica* (W. H. D. Suringar, *Historia Critica Scholasticarum Latinorum* [Leyden, 1884], i, 219–235). Thierry’s reading in works of
an *Introduction* precede the fragment of the *Commentary* which has been preserved. The *Introduction* is devoted to asking ten questions concerning rhetoric: its genus, definition, matter, duty, end, parts, species, instrument, who the orator is, and why the art is so called, and to these two specific questions are added: the intention of Tully in this work and the utility of the work. The genus of rhetoric is still civil science, it is not a part of logic, and its matter is hypothesis. Nor is the position of Thierry an anachronistic piece of conservatism, for one of the works which was most influential in preparing the way for the new knowledge of the thirteenth century and which was eagerly consulted as a source of information concerning the Arabic learning, the *De Divisione Philosophiae* of Gundissalinus, contains a section on rhetoric which not merely ask the same ten questions as Thierry of Chartres but is identical, apart from slight variations, with the *Introduction* to his *Commentary*. Gundissalinus differs slightly from Thierry in

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1 *Ibid.*, 217: *Genus igitur artis rhetoricae est qualitas ipsius artificii secundum ejus effectum: hoc autem est, quod ipsum artificio est, pars civilis scientiae major. Nam civilis ratio dicitur quidquid civitas aut rationabiliter dicit aut agit; dicimus enim: ratio est hoc vel illud facere vel dicere. Item civilis ratio dicitur, scientia dicendi aliquid rationabiliter et faciendi. Et haec quidem ratio, scientia civilis dicitur, cuius quidem pars integra, vel etiam major, rhetorica est. Nam sapientia i.e. rerum conceptio secundum eorum naturam, et rhetorica civilem scientiam component. Et enim nisi quis sapiens et eloquens fuerit, civilem scientiam habere non dicitur. Major vero pars civilis scientiae dicitur rhetorica, quoniam magis operatur in civilibus causis quam sapientia, etsi sine sapientia nihil prosit. Maximam enim virtutem habet eloquentia in civitate, si sapientiae juncta sit.* Thierry then goes on to compare this solution with Boethius' doctrine that the genus of rhetoric is *facultas*, and finds them in agreement since the same science is an *art* in the master who teaches its rules and a *faculty* in the orator. He is explicit in excluding rhetoric from logic: *Non est autem dicendum, rhetorica aut facultas; idcirco quod logica circa thesin solam i.e. circa genera agendi, tantummodo versatur.* Cf. *ibid.* 219 for *materia*. Cf. Adelard of Bath, *De Eodem et Diverso Beeträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* [henceforth *BGM*], Band iv, Heft 1), pp. 19 ff.

2 Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De Divisione Philosophiae* (ed. L. Baur, *BGM*, Band iv, Heft 2–3, Münster, 1903), pp. 63–69. For the strange history of scholarly inquiries into the commentary of Thierry, cf. M. Grabmann. 'Eine lateinische Übersetzung des pseudo-Aristotelischen Rhetorica ad Alexandrum aus dem 13. Jahrhundert,' *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philosophisch-Historische Abteilung (1931/2, Heft 4), pp. 4–5: In spite of the fact that it was published by Suringar in 1834, the fragmentary *Commentary* was discussed as an unpublished document by Rohde in 1881, Bücheler in 1888, and Thomas in 1884; its author was supposed to have been a contemporary of Theodoric the Great until Thomas suggested that the document was mediaeval (and consequently of very little interest); finally Manitius identified it as the work of Thierry or Theodoric of Chartres, and Klibansky pointed out its identity with the work published by Suringar. Grabmann does not notice that there is one further coincidence, viz., the identity of one of the three sections — pp. 216–223 in Suringar — with the section on rhetoric in Gundissalinus. Short of examination of the manuscripts — unfortunately impossible at this time — the question of priority is difficult to decide: some of the sections contained in Thierry but omitted by Gundissalinus seem rather in the nature of additions to than omissions from an original text, and the references seem better suited to the *Commentary* than to the *De Divisione Philosophiae* (as, e.g., where Thierry says [p. 220]: *Sed quid sit circumstantia, in sequentibus melius dictetur,* Gundissalinus says [p. 60]: *Set quid sit circumstancia in Tullio dictetur,* although no further reference is made to Cicero on this point); on the other hand, the supposition that the work of Thierry was prior runs into the grave difficulty that all of the sciences in the *De Divisione Philosophiae* are treated by means of the same ten questions here applied to rhetoric.
the classification of rhetoric, for whereas Thierry would have it a part of civil science and not a part of logic, Gundissalinus classifies both rhetoric and poetic among the eight parts of logic, but he also classifies rhetoric and poetic as parts of civil science.¹

Hugh of St Victor, who was contemporary with Thierry of Chartres, follows the suggestion of the Aristotelian division of the sciences into theoretic, practical, and mechanical (which seems to be Hugh's substitute for Aristotle's productive science): logic is a fourth branch and not a part of politics, which falls under the practical sciences. Moreover, his classification of logic makes an excellent transition from the customary classification according to the trivium of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic to the 'Aristotelian' classification as parts of logic and according to the kinds of proof. Following Isidore of Seville, Hugh points out the double etymology of λόγος, i.e., sermo and ratio, and argues that logic can be called either a verbal or a rational science (sermocinalis sive rationalis scientia); rational logic (which Hugh also calls dissertiva) is divided into dialectic and rhetoric, while verbal logic is the genus of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, and therefore rational logic is contained under it.² This treatment of the traditional trivium is supplemented, however, by another division of logic into grammar and ratio disserendi or 'dissertive' logic, which is concerned with words as understood (de vocibus secundum intellectus). 'Dissertive' or rational logic is in turn divided into integral parts, i.e., parts shared by its kinds, which turn out to be the Ciceronian distinction into discovery and judgment, and divisive parts: demonstrative, probable, and sophistic; the two parts of probable proof are dialectic and rhetoric.³

John of Salisbury, one of the pupils of Thierry of Chartres, who had studied the whole of Aristotle's Organon and who was widely read in Cicero and Quintilian, attributes to Plato the division of logic into dialectic and rhetoric, but prefers, as more philosophic, the division into demonstrative, probable, and sophistic, with the further division of probable into dialectic and rhetoric.⁴ William of Conches, on the other hand, whom John calls the finest grammarian after Bernard

¹ The section on the genus of rhetoric in Gundissalinus (p. 64) is the same as the statement quoted above (p. 17, n. 1) from Thierry, but stops short before the discussion of Boethius and the statement that rhetoric is not a part of logic. In the section on logic, Gundissalinus cites Alfarabi for the eight parts of logic (ibid., 71): 'Secundum Alfarambium octo sunt partes logice: cathegorie, perhermenias, analetica priora, analetica posteriora, thopica, sophistica, rethorica, poetica.' He need not have gone to the Arabs for this doctrine, for the equivalent of the six books of Aristotle's Organon plus rhetoric and poetic constituted the logic taught by Gerbert (cf. above, p. 16, n. 3). Gundissalinus gives as the genus of logic that it is a part and instrument of philosophy (ibid., 69) and denies that its matter is 'thesis,' arguing that it is the second intention of the understanding (ibid., 70–71). The genus of poetic is the same as rhetoric (ibid., 54): 'Genus huuius artis [sc. poeticae] est, quod ipsa est pars ciuilibus scienecie, que est pars eloquencie. Non enim parum operatur in ciuilibus, quod delectat uel edificat in sciencia uel in moribus.'

² Didascalicon i. 11 (ed. C. H. Buttimer [Washington, 1939], pp. 20–21 [or i. 12; PL 176, 749–750]). Cf. Isidore of Seville, Eymologiae ii. 24. 7.


⁴ Metalogicon ii. 3. (ed. C. C. J. Webb, Oxford, 1929), pp. 64–65. Baldwin complains (o.c., p. 157) that rhetoric is barely mentioned in the Metalogicon and seems 'to have no distinctive composing function'; the few references which he finds indicate that he was looking for rhetoric before the treatment of logic, whereas John treats it under the Topics. Cf. Metalogicon iii. 5. p. 139 and esp. 10, pp. 154–155: 'Quia ergo exercitatio dialectice ad alterum est; pares, quos producit et quos rationibus
of Chartres, of Chartres,\textsuperscript{1} divides eloquence, which the ancients called logic, into grammar, ratio disserendi, and rhetoric.\textsuperscript{2}

IV

The translations of Aristotle affected the discussions of theology no less than those of philosophy, and the changes in rhetoric, and in the relations of rhetoric to dialectic, are reflected in the methods of theology: 'Aristotelian' conceptions of the organization of logic with rhetoric as one of its parts were not, however, intruded into theology, since the opposition was between the Augustinian conception of a single body of theological and philosophic truth possessed of a single method, and the conception of a philosophy independent in method and subject matter from theology; and therefore the simple organization of the trivium as three rational or verbal sciences continued in theology and even in philosophy under the influence of Augustine long after it became obsolete in the philosophy influenced by Aristotle. Even as early as the sixth century when Cassiodorus wrote his Expositio in Psalterium he could appeal, in his introductory chapters, On the Elocution of the Whole Divine Law and On the Proper Elocution of the Psalter, to an impressive list of learned Fathers — Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, Hilary — who had studied both the figures which are common to sacred and secular letters and the proper modes of divine speech which are not touched by grammarians or rhetoricians.\textsuperscript{3} Divine eloquence is not formed of human words or involved in human ambiguities, but since its purpose is to spread divine law to all the corners of the world, it makes many uses of modes of speech, and it is 'succinct with definitions, adorned with figures, marked by the propriety of words, expedited by the constructions of syllogisms'; and while these devices are certain and clear in the Scriptures, they stand in need of the liberal arts when they come into contact with the opinions and disputes of men.\textsuperscript{4} His commentary consists largely of such aids to understanding, dotted with identifications of kinds

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of definition, figures of speech, forms of arguments. The evolution of this use of rhetoric consists primarily in the increasing formalization of the methods of interpreting Scripture and the rules of divine eloquence, and secondarily in the recurrent application of the secular art to Scripture and the recurrent expressions of concern at the excesses of the liberal arts in such application. In the one line of development, Augustine's simple suggestion that things as well as words are signs was elaborated until the spiritual sense, which balanced the literal sense, was divided into three kinds, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogic; and this theological development of rhetoric eventually in turn influenced mundane or poetic rhetoric. In the other line of development, more suspect of error and more frequently condemned in one form by conservative theologians who practised it in another form, defending it as indispensable to the understanding of Scripture, rhetoric supplied devices to clarify the meanings and remove the ambiguities, of Scriptural statements. Abailard begins his *Commentary on the Epistle of St Paul to the Romans* with the statement: 'The intention of all divine Scripture is to teach or to move in the manner of a rhetorical speech,' and derives his triple division of the Old and New Testaments from these two purposes. The

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1 Cf. *ibid.* i (PL 70, 27) for identification of two kinds of definition according to the technical terms of Victorinus; (PL 70, 32) where the figure is explained by means of the mathematical disciplines; vi. 1 (PL 70, 61) where the fashion in which the divine eloquence has been enriched by the various arts and disciplines is illustrated by discussion of rhetorical *status*; xliii. 15 (PL 70, 314) where the figure of *anaphora* is identified, and so *passim.*

2 Cf. Augustine, *De Utilitate Credendi* 3, 5; PL 42, 68 (historical, aetiological, analogical, allegorical senses); Gregory the Great, *Moralia, Epistola Missoria*; PL 75, 510–515 (historical, allegorical, moral); Peter Abailard, *Expositio in Hexaemeron*; PL 178, 731 (historical, moral, and mystic); Hugh of St Victor, *De Sacramentis, Prologus* 4; PL 176, 184 (historical, allegorical, tropological); and Peter of Poitier, *Allegoriae super Tabernaculum Moysi, Prologus* (ed. P. S. Moore and J. A. Corbett, Notre Dame, 1988), p. 1 (historical, allegorical, moral, anagogic); cf. P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Notre Dame, 1986), pp. 65–77. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* i. q. 1, a. 10: 'Respondendo dicendum quod auctor sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cujus potestate est ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest) sed etiam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significant, hoc habet proprium ista scientia quod ipsae res significatae per voces, etiam significant aliquid.' The first of these significations is historical or literal, the second (in which things signify other things) spiritual, and the spiritual interpretation is further divided into allegorical, moral, and anagogic. Dante follows the division of Aquinas; cf. *Epistola X Domino Cani Grandi de Scala* vii. 98–116; *Convivio*, ii. 1 (cf. *ibid.* 14 for rhetoric). The 'four senses' are also used to explain the 'form of wisdom' (cf. Bonaventura, *In Hexaemeron, Collatio* ii [Opera Omnia, ed. Quaracchi, 1891], v, 336–342, i.e., uniform, multiform [allegorical, anagogic, tropological, each of which has two forms], omniform, and nulliform) and to classify the sciences (cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode* [Freiburg i/B, 1911] ii, 43, n. 1, where a quotation is given from an unpublished manuscript, dated broadly as posterior to Hugh of St Victor, in which the sciences are divided into theoretic, practical, and logical; practical science in turn is divided into actual [ethics, economics, and politics] and inspective, which is divided into *historia* and *spiritualis intelligentia*; history simply states the order of things without any hidden meaning apparent from that conveyed by the words; the spiritual understanding is divided into the tropological, allegorical, and anagogic. Rational logic is divided into dialectic, apodictic [or demonstrative], and sophistic. Bonaventura also uses them as the fourfold division in the 'light of sacred Scripture' (*De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, 5 [ed. Quaracchi, 1891], v, 321).

3 Commentaria super *S. Pauli Epistolam ad Romanos, Prologus*, PL 178, 783–784.
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divine pages cannot be read and appreciated without grammar and rhetoric. An anonymous commentary on Romans repeats Abailard’s statement of the twofold rhetorical purpose of the Old and New Testament after having specified that all the arts are servants to divinity: grammar which teaches constructions, dialectic which expounds by arguments, and rhetoric which consists in persuasion. Even theologians who, like Robert of Melun, opposed the excessive use of rhetoric in secular as well as in divine letters, repeated the same judgment of the rhetorical purposes of Scripture.

The method of rhetoric was, moreover, put to another and even more characteristic use in the interpretation of theological doctrine. The scholastic method, as it came to be called, grew out of the assemblage of ‘sentences’ which derived their name and their initial methods of treatment from rhetoric. The early collections of canon law were collections of authorities — statements from Scripture, decisions of councils, decretals, opinions of the Fathers — which because of the practical problems involved in direction of action presented urgently the problem of bringing discordant or apparently discordant canons into concordance. When Peter Abailard assembled apparently contradictory texts in his Sic et Non, the rules for interpreting them which he set forth in the Prologue are developments of the rules elaborated by a long line of canon lawyers — notably Hincmar of Rheims, Bernold of Constance, Ivo of Chartres — and involve such directions as careful consideration of context, comparison of texts, specification of time, place, and person, determination of original cause of statement, differentiation of general measures from particular. Although this method led to a further step in the dialectical resolution of the contradictions, the method at this stage is rhetorical rather than dialectical. The rules of interpretation of the Prologue of the Sic et Non, thus, approximate the performance of Abailard’s Commentary

1 Introductio ad Theologiam ii. 2, PL 178, 1044: ‘At jam profecto nec grammaticam a Christiano legi convenit, sine documentis cujus nec divina intelligi pagina, nec scriptura aliqua. Sic nec rhetoricae, quae omnis eloquentiae tradit ornamenta, quibus maxime sacra Scriptura est referta, nec ejus decor nisi his diligenter assignatis elucere poterit.’


3 M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, ii, 349, n. 2. H. Denifle, Die Abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther über Justitia (Rom. 1. 17) und Justificatio (Mainz, 1905), p. 76: ‘Ad erudicionem autem ipsius omnes scripture facte sunt, quorum partes sunt tam sacre scripture, quam etnische. In etnische enim, id est gentilbus, scripturis et sermonum compositio et rerum proprietatis docet. Sermonum composciis in trivio, rerum proprietis in mathematicis disciplinis secundum extrinsecu et intrinsecu... Intencionem vero more rethoricis oracionis docere et monere...’


5 Ibid. 286 ff., where, however, the method is stated as dialectical. Cf. M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, i, 234 ff. and P. Fournier and G. Le Bras, Histoire des Collections Canoniales en Occident (Paris, 1932), ii, 384 ff. In the more orthodox tradition theology derived its customary organization, indirectly from rhetoric, in Augustine’s division of all doctrine into problems of things and problems of signs; cf. P. Lombard, Sententiarum Liber i, dist. 1, cap. 1. The other distinction which Augustine makes at the beginning of the De Doctrina Christiana, of all treatment of the Scriptures into the mode of discovery and the mode of statement, served as basis of organization of treatises on preaching (cf. Bonaventura, Ars Concionandi [ed. Quaracchi, 1891], ix, 8.
on Romans, which is grammatical and rhetorical; but the texts such as those assembled there serve him as a store house of quotations for his systematic works, the Theologia 'Summi Boni,' the Theologia Christiana, and the Introductio ad Theologiam, in which the method which Abailard calls dialectical is used to resolve their differences, not by consideration of contexts and circumstances, but by reduction to an orderly body of true propositions. The difference, far from being slight, was to grow into one of the marks of differentiation between the line of Christian theology which adapted itself to the Aristotelian philosophy and made use of logic and dialectic and the line of Christian theology and philosophy which continued the distinction of the trivium and subordinated dialectic to rhetoric. One of the numerous admirers of Abailard who tried to remove the taint of unorthodoxy from his doctrines made that readjustment by shifting the functions of the arts, assigning to grammar a concern with meanings, to dialectic the production of conviction, and to rhetoric finally the motivation of the will. This is a doctrine, moreover, which need suffer no opprobrium because of its connection with Abailard, since the same domination of the trivium by rhetoric is expressed, partly in the same words, by Bernard Sylvester, the friend of Thierry of Chartres, in his commentary on Virgil's Aeneid, a context which seems safe from the danger of heresy.

1 [Anonymous] Ysagoge in Theologam (ed. A. Landgraf, Ecrits Théologiques de l'Ecole d'Abélard [Louvain, 1934]), p. 72: 'Eloquentia vero est scientia ad congruam agnitorum prolationem suum formans artificem. Que, quia triplex habet effictiam, tres habet partes, respondentque effictiae partibus ut effectus causas. Est enim prima grammatica, que pertinet ad intellectum; secunda dialectica, que ad fidem; tertia rethorica, que ad persuasionem. Quod enim prima voxum attendit accidents, ideo fit, ut secundum ea competens fiat earum contextus ad manifestandum conceptum loquentis vel ad constituendum consimilem in auditore. Sed quia, si pulsetur de veritate, intellectus, quem indicat et constituit, nequit fidem facere, succedit dialectica, que acceptis orationibus a prima componit ex eis argumentationem, qua fidem confort. Sed quia possimus intelligere et intellectum credere et tamen illud nolle, consummationem dat rethorica. Hec enim accipiens argumentationes a logica, ut illa orationes a grammaticae, ex eis per orationem [l. perorationem] facit et, quod prima intelligere, secunda credere, ipsa facit velle.'

2 Commentum Bernardi Silvestris super sex libros Eneidos Virgili, lib. vi (ed. G. Riedel [Gryphiswaldae, 1924], p. 31): 'Eloquentia est scientia formans suum lectorem ad congruam cognitorum prolationem. Haec autem Trivia dicitur quia [a] tribus artibus quasi tribus viis ad eam incedimus. Ut autem perfecte habeatur eloquentia, primo oportet scire loqui absque solecismo et barbarismo quod per grammaticam habetur. Deinde sic locundo oportet scire aliquid probare vel improbare quod fit per dialecticam. Adhuc necessarium [oportet] persuadere vel dissuadere: possunt enim auditores grammatica oratione aliquid intelligere, dialectica probatione de eodem certi esse et tamen illud nolle: ideo necessaria rethorica persuasio. Itaque est grammatica initium eloquentiae, dialectica dicitur perfectio eloquentiae.' Cf. ibid., pp. 36, 38, 87–88. It would easily be possible to attach too much significance to the order in which the arts of the trivium are enumerated; yet many of the enumerations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries underline the importance of the order, and even before that time authors tend to a consistency in their enumerations which suggests that some degree of importance was attached to the enumeration. Dialectic appears third in the lists of Cassiodorus (Institutiones, ii Praefatio, p. 91), Isidore (Etymologiae i. 2) Alcuin (Grammatica, PL 101, 883: 'Sunt igitur gradus, quos quaeritis, et in quibus sit semper ad ascendendum quam curiosi modo estis ad videndum: grammatica, rhetorica, dialectica . . . '), Rhabanus Maurus (De Clericorum Institutione iii. 18, PL 107, 395: 'Prima ergo liberalium artium est grammatica, secunda rhetorica, tertia dialectica . . . '). Rhetoric is third in Augustine
The two general tendencies which came to their culmination in the thirteenth century, that by which rhetoric was made part of logic and that by which rhetoric became an instrument of theology, are determined by the important methodological differences which separate the Aristotelians and the Augustinians. For Thomas Aquinas rhetoric is one of the parts of logic concerned with probable argumentation; for Bonaventura rhetoric is the culmination of the trivium. Thomas wrote a commentary on two books of Aristotle's *Organon*, and since he separated the method and subject of the philosophic from those of the theological truth, he could use the devices of Aristotle in the *a posteriori* proofs of his systematic theology and those of Augustine in his commentaries on Scripture; Bonaventura wrote no work on logic but did compose an excellent *Art of Preaching*, which is useful for the interpretation of his theological treatises and commentaries as well as his sermons.

The translation of the whole of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (which was called the New Ethics in contrast to the truncated earlier translation) brought to further refinement the solution of questions concerning the relation of rhetoric to civil questions: according to Aquinas the matter with which rhetoric is concerned is civil, but rhetoric must not be confused with politics. In much the same fashion the terminology and conclusions of the earlier rhetorical discussion enter into Thomas' classification of the parts of logic. The parts of logic or rational science or rational philosophy are determined by the diversity of the acts of reason: they are three of which the first is an act of immediate understanding and the last two are acts of reason. The first is the operation of the mind called (by Averroes) information of understanding or imagination through understanding; the doctrine which Aristotle treats in the *Categories* is ordered to this act of reason. The second is the operation of composition and division which results in truth or falsity; the doctrine which Aristotle treats in the *De Interpretatione* is concerned with this act of reason. Finally, the third act, which is the proper function of reason, is discursive movement from one thing to another, from something known to the unknown: the remaining four books of the *Organon* are concerned with this operation of reason. It may take any of three forms in conformity to a threefold diversity in nature: in some cases nature acts from necessity without the possibility of divergence, in some cases it operates for the most part in a certain way but with the possibility of deviation from its proper act, and there are therefore in addition to necessary operations two additional kinds of natural acts, those

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1 In *Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio* i. Lectio 3 (ed. A. M. Pirotta [Turin, 1934], n. 36, p. 19). Infallible proof is impossible in human affairs, and therefore the conjectural probability of the rhetorician is adequate; cf. *Summa Theologica*, i a, ii ae, q. 105, a. 2, ad 8: 'Ad octavum dicendum, quod in negotiis humanis non potest haberi demonstrativa probatio et infallibilis, sed sufficit aliqua conjecturalis probabilitas secundum quam rhetor persuadet.'

2 Ibid. x. Lectio 16, n. 2175, p. 689.
which occur for the most part and those in which nature deviates from what is proper to it. Corresponding to these there are three processes of reason: those by which scientific certitude is acquired and in which no deviation from truth is possible; those which come to conclusions true for the most part but not necessary; and those in which reason deviates from the true because of some defect of principle. The part of logic which treats the first of these processes is called Judicative, since its judgment is made with the certitude of science, and this part is treated in the Analytics: the Prior Analytics is concerned with the certitude of judgment which is based only on the form of the syllogism, the Posterior Analytics with the demonstrative syllogism in which the certitude depends on matter or on the necessary propositions of which the syllogism is composed. The part of logic which is subject to the second process of reason is called Inventive, for discovery is not always with certitude. Topic or Dialectic treats of this process when it leads to conviction or opinion (fides vel opinio); Rhetoric treats of it when it leads only to a kind of suspicion without total exclusion of the contrary possibility; Poetic treats of it when estimation inclines to one of the two parts of a contradiction only because of the manner of its representation. Finally the third process of reason is called Sophistic and is treated by Aristotle in the De Sophisticis Elenchis.1

Bonaventura's conception of rhetoric and logic, on the other hand, is quite unaffected by the Aristotelian philosophy: they are ordered in the trivium, dominated by rhetoric, and they are treated, with the other arts, by reduction to theology, or as parts of the first vision of God which is by natural intelligence, or as part of the gift of science which is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. There are four lights by which we are illuminated in knowledge: the exterior light of the mechanical arts, the inferior light of sensitive knowledge, the interior light of philosophic knowledge, and the superior light of grace and sacred Scripture. The interior light by which we are illuminated to intelligible truths is of three kinds, rational, natural, and moral, corresponding to the traditional division of the philosophic sciences into logic, physics, and ethics. Rational truth or the truth of words is of three kinds, the expression of concepts (treated by grammar), the movement to belief (treated by logic), and the movement to love or hate (treated by rhetoric).2 The actual reduction of rational philosophy to theology is accomplished by consideration of the speaker (his expression of the conception of his mind is dependent on the eternal Word), his statement (in its congruity, truth, and adornment, is seen the order of living, for actions by virtue of these have measure [modus], beauty [species], and order [ordo]), and the hearer (in whom the ends of speech are expressing, teaching, and moving, which are accomplished, as Augustine shows, only by the one true doctor who can impress

2 De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam 4 (Opera Omnia [Quaracchi, 1891] v, 321): 'Et quoniam tripliciter potest aliquis per sermonem exprimere quod habet apud se, ut scilicet notum faciat mentis suae conceptum, vel ut amplius moveat ad credendum, vel ut moveat ad amorem, vel odium: ideo sermocinalis sive rationalis philosophia triplicatur, scilicet in grammaticam, logiceam et rhetoriceam; quorum prima est ad exprimendum, secunda ad docendum, tertia ad movendum. Prima respicit rationem ut apprehensivam; secunda, ut indicativam; tertia, ut motivam. Et quia ratio apprehendit per sermonem congruum, iudicat per verum, movet per sermonem ornatum: hinc est, quod haec tripexus scientia has tres passiones circa sermonem considerat.'
species, infuse light, and give virtue to the heart of the hearer).\textsuperscript{1} Or again, the first vision of God, which is by natural intelligence, is divided into three rays, since the light which is the truth of the soul illuminates the truth of things, of signs, and of morals: the second irradiation of truth is divided into three parts: grammar, logic, and rhetoric.\textsuperscript{2} The consideration of general and special forms of argument in necessary matter as well as the consideration of ‘topical places’ (in which induction proceeds by probable rather than necessary arguments) and sophistical places falls within logic, while rhetoric is concerned once more with civil utility and is divided into demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial.\textsuperscript{3} Or again, the fifth gift of the Holy Spirit is science, comprising the three philosophic sciences (rational, natural, moral), in all of which, including rational philosophy or verbal science, Solomon was adept.\textsuperscript{4}

It is in the platonizing Augustinian tradition, moreover, that music and poetry assume a broad sense and dominant importance: Roger Bacon assigns to music the function which Bonaventura ascribed to rhetoric, and then distinguishes both rhetoric and poetic into two kinds, a theoretic rhetoric and poetic (or \textit{rhetorica docens} and \textit{poetica docens}) which are parts of logic, and an applied rhetoric and poetic (or \textit{rhetorica utens} and \textit{poetica utens}) which are parts of moral philosophy.\textsuperscript{5}

The opposed tendencies which led to the dominance of rhetoric in the Augustinian tradition and to the importance of logical demonstration in the Thomist tradition are integral with the total complexions of the two theologies as evidenced in the conclusion of Bonaventura that theology is neither theoretic nor practical but an affective habit mid-way between theory and practice as opposed to the argument of Thomas that theology subsumes both theoretic and practical sciences and is itself more theoretic than practical.\textsuperscript{6} It is a distinction which later historians have treated crudely by trying to differentiate ‘voluntarism’ from ‘rationalism.’

V

Separate both from the tradition of the rhetoric assimilated to dialectic and proof and that of the rhetoric assimilated to theology and edification — and the

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid. 15–18, pp. 323–324.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{In Hexaemeron, Collatio iv, 18–25; v, 352–353.}
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. 20–21, pp. 352–353.
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{De Septem Donis Spiritus Sancti, Collatio iv. 5–12; v, 474–475; esp. 8: ‘Impossibile est, quod sapientia fiat doctrina nisi per sermonem. Sermo autem non est sufficiens ad docendum, nisi sit sententiosus. Et non loquitur homo sententiose, nisi sermo eius \textit{discussius, inquisitius, et persuasius}, scilicet quod habeat sermonem potentem ad loquendum omne illud, quod potest apprehendi vel nosci, vel ad quod affectus potest inclinari. Congru autem exprimit quod dicit per \textit{grammaticam}, rationabiliter investigat per scientiam \textit{logicam} et efficaciter persuadet per \textit{rhetoricae}. Ista igitur est pars philosophiae, scilicet scientia sermocinalis, quae triplex est, ut patet, quam adeptus est Salomon.’}
\textsuperscript{6} Bonaventura, \textit{Proemium in Librum Primum Sententiarum} q. 3 concl.; i, 18; Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologica} i. q. i, a. 4.
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object of suspicion and attack by both — a third tradition of rhetoric seems to have flourished, at least during the second and third periods of the other two traditions, indifferent alike to the logical differentiation of necessary and probable arguments and the theological limitation of persuasion to profound or salubrious truths. Since the three traditions engaged in a three-cornered dispute there is no single statement of the issue, for to logicians the practitioners of this new art seemed sophists, while theologians lumped them with the heretical dialecticians and garrulous ratiocinators; from the point of view of the new art, which professed an exclusive concern with practical issues and effective applications, that is, with actions or with words, the rules of logic were themselves open to question, and visionary theory and inapplicable generalization were devoid of moral attraction. For the most part we know about the early members of this tradition from the violence of the attacks upon them and the bitterness of the satire in which they were portrayed, but gradually in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries they limited their statements to figures and forms of words, accomplishing their practical objectives by that device in a fashion which met with little effective opposition from logicians or theologians: and since they were unhampered by the need to consider things or thoughts, they were prolific in production of the ‘new’ methods — they were fond of calling themselves moderni — which constituted one of the important guises in which rhetoric entered the fourteenth century and the Renaissance.

A few fragments of the works of Anselm the Peripatetic are the only remains of the ‘Drogonic’ sect — followers of the philosopher Drogo — which Anselm would have us believe was numerous and influential. He calls his art rhetoric; he professes allegiance to that art along with Hermagoras, Tully, Servius, Quintilian, Victorinus, Grillius, and Boethius, and thought to illustrate it in his treatise De Materia Artis (now lost) and in the examples of rhetoric set forth in his Rhetorimachia; he specifies that rhetoric demonstrates, not truths, but verisimilitudes disguised as truths.1 The Rhetorimachia is divided into three parts, one devoted to each of the genera, demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial, and each example takes the form of an attempt to turn the arguments of an opponent against him. The bearing of Anselm’s performance on logic is not far to seek, since his approach permits him to deny the principle of excluded middle,2 while its relation to theology is no less apparent from the allegory of the dream, related as part of his treatment of deliberative rhetoric, in which the embraces and arguments of three virgins named Dialectic, Rhetoric, and Grammar turn him from communion with the saints in Heaven.3 A ‘sophist’ named John seems in like fashion to have had a numerous following of whom Roscelin of Compiègne alone is easily identifiable.4 In the twelfth century John of Salisbury attacks the doctrine of a teacher

2 Rhetorimachia i, p. 34; cf. Epistola ad Drogonem Magistrum et Condiciipulos de Logica Disputatone in Gallia Habita, pp. 56–58.
3 Rhetorimachia ii, p. 42.
4 Cf. Historia Francica (quoted by J. Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik [BGPM, Band vn, Heft 5], p. 33, n. 2): ‘In dialectica quoque hi potentes extiterunt sophistae: Joannes, qui eandem artem sophisticam vocalem esse disseruit, Rotbertus Parisiensis, Roscelinus Compensis, Arnulfus Laudensis. Hi Joannis fuerunt sectatores, qui etiam quamplures habuerunt audi-
whom he disguises under the name of Cornificius (allying with himself in the attack the most illustrious masters of the age, among others Gilbert de la Porrée, Thierry of Chartres, William of Conches, Peter Abailard) who broke that union of wisdom and eloquence which is the foundation of philosophy, of society, and of morals, and who made everything new in his teaching, innovating in grammar, modifying dialectic, despising rhetoric; his exclusive reliance on the precepts of eloquence apparently leads Cornificius to exploit the traditional puzzles of the sophists which turn on the confusion of word and thing or the application of a word or statement to itself.¹

This tradition of rhetoric took form, for the most part, not in controversy or theory but in a vast number of textbooks which grew in three distinct groups differentiated according to the subject matters once treated by rhetoric but now concerned with verbal forms employed in those three fields in lieu of direct treatment of subject matter. First, rhetoric had contributed to the method of studying law, but the substantial consideration of law had moved into theology and had taken with it most of the appurtenances which might have made the law a learned profession, leaving only the verbal rhetoric of the dictamen.² Second, the art of preaching which had assumed in the Christian tradition an exhortative function approximating that of ancient deliberative oratory — once due allowance is made for the close similarity between the two activities. The transition was probably due to the influence of the Trivium.


² For the voluminous literature on the *Ars Dictaminis and Ars Notaria*, cf. L. J. Paetow, *A Guide to the Study of Medieval History* (2nd ed., New York, 1931), pp. 448–452; for the relation of these arts to rhetoric, cf. N. Valois, *De Arte Scribendi Epistolae apud Gallicos Medii Aevi Scriptores Rhetorices* (Bibliothèque de l’École de Chartres, 29 [1880], 161, 257); for the relation of rhetoric to the teaching of law, cf. P. Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts*, pp. 60–66. The manner of the change, no less than the pride in the novelty of it, may be judged from the contents of Boncompagni’s two works, the *Rhetorica Antiqua* (arranged in six books according to the character of the letter to be written) and the *Rhetorica novissima* (arranged in thirteen books: ‘Primus est de origine iuris. Secundus est de rhetoricae partibus et causarum generibus. Tertius est de diffinitionibus. Quartus est de naturis et consuetudinibus oratorum. Quintus de causarum exordiis. Sextus de principiis conuentorum. Septimus de rhetoricis argumentis. Octavus de memoria. Nonus de adornationibus. Decimus de invectivis. Undecimus de consiliis. Duodecimus de colloquio. Tertius decimus de conditionibus’). Boncompagni professes in the prologue to the former work not to remember ever having read Cicero, but he adds that he never dissuaded anyone who wanted to read him; and in the latter work he gives three reasons why he undertook to find a new rhetoric after Cicero had compiled a rhetoric from the infinite precepts of rhetoricians: (1) according to Boethius the rhetoric edited by the ancients consists solely of precepts, without doctrine or utility, (2) students in civil and canon law would not get a solid foundation in the liberal arts, (3) Cicero’s rhetoric is rendered void according to students of law because it is never read in ‘ordinary’ courses, but is run through and taught like a mechanical art by stealth; to these he adds a fourth: that Cicero was mistaken about the origin of the law. (Cf. L. Rockinger, ‘Über die Ars Dictandi und die Summæ dictaminum in Italien,’ *Sitzungsberichte der Königl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München, hist. Kl.,* i [1861], 135–145.) For the closely related art of pleading,
made for differences between the terrestrial and celestial city — gradually moved to a formalism in which doctrine was left to theology and attention was centered on three problems: propriety of division of the subject stated in the theme of the sermon, brevity of distinction, and utility of expansion.1 Finally, the art of poetry came to be considered after the twelfth century, not a branch of grammar, but alternately a kind of argumentation or persuasion (and as such subordinate to logic or morals) and a form of composition (and as such to be treated in terms of style, organization, and figures borrowed from rhetoric).2 In common, these three tendencies continue the terms and some points of the organization of the Ad Heren-

1 Cf. the anonymous Art of Preaching, portions of which are edited in the Opera Omnia S. Bon-ventureae (ix, 6–7), in which four modes of preaching are distinguished: (1) that which concords really and verbally with the words of Scripture — used by ‘modern’ doctors and expounded in this treatise — (2) that which employs only real concordance with Scripture — appropriate to those newly learned in theology — (3) that limited to verbal concordance, and (4) contrasted to the modern method, the ancient mode ‘quod observant antiqui Sancti, sicut Augustinus et Bernardus et multi alii, quorum sermones in Ecclesia recitantur, in quibus non proponitur aliquod thema, quod sit materia praedicandi, nec solent divisiones vel distinctiones fieri, quae postmodum concordentur, sed quasi narrative procedit.’ The modern doctors advise against following this mode for the curious reason that these Fathers were, in a manner, founders of the Church (quasi Ecclesiae fundatores), and therefore they avoided all curiosity concerning distinctions of themes and subdivisions of members and concordances of both. Bonaventura likewise divides the problems of preaching into three parts, divisiones, distinctiones, dilatationes (cf. Ars concionandi, Prooemium, ix, 8). For an excellent exposition of the technique of the mediaeval sermon and review of the methods expounded in most important medi-aeval handbooks, cf. E. Gilson, ‘Michel Menot et la Technique du Sermon Médiéval,’ Les Idées et les Lettres (Paris, 1932), pp. 93–154. Cf. H. Caplan, ‘Classical Rhetoric and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching,’ Classical Philology, xxviii (1933), 73–96, ‘Rhetorical Invention in Some Mediaeval Tractates on Preaching,’ Spectulum, ii (1927), 284–295, ‘Henry of Hesse on the Art of Preaching,’ PMLA xlvi (1933), 340–361. The treatises of Robert of Basevorn and Thomas of Wales are pub-lished in T.-M. Charland, Artes Praedicandi, Contribution à l’Histoire de la Rhetorique au Moyen Age (Ottawa, 1956), preceded by a survey of writers of Arts and the customary form of theory. Cf. the differentiation of the two modes most used by moderns, the French and the English (Robert of Basevorn, Forma Praedicandi 7, p. 244). Cf. also M. M. Davy, Les Sermons Universitaires Parisiens de 1230–1231 (Paris, 1981), G. R. Owst, Preaching in Medieval England, an Introduction to Sermon Manuscripts of the Period c. 1350–1450 (Cambridge, 1926), and C. H. Haskins, Studies in Mediaeval Culture (Oxford, 1929), pp. 36–71.

2 In early treatments poetry, considered as metric, was a part of grammar, while as a form of argument it was a part of topic or dialectic. Thus Cassiodorus defines grammar (Institutiones ii. 1. 1. p. 94): ‘grammatica vero est peritia pulchre loquendi ex poetis illustribus auctoribusque collecta; officium eius est sine vitio dictionem prosalem metricamque componere,’ but he includes the poets among the artists to whom topical arguments are supplied by memory (ibid. 3. 17, p. 127; cf. ibid. 2. 2. p. 98, for the function of memory in discovery). Cf. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae i. 39; the Venerable Bede, De Arte Metrica (PL 90, 140). John of Salisbury notes the tendency to make poetic an art by itself or to assimilate it to rhetoric rather than to grammar, but he is explicit in his own resolution of the problem; cf. Metaphoricon i. 17, p. 43: ‘Profecto aut poetaicam grammaticam obtinebit, aut poetica a numero liberalium disciplinarum eliminabitur.’ Cf. C. Fierville, Une Grammaire Latine Inédite du XIIIe Siècle (Paris, 1866), pp. 94–119. The transition is gradual from a consideration merely of the words, their character, and position to the consideration of the general conditions or
nium and of Cicero's De Inventione, but the commonplaces which have been put to so many uses are no longer devices for discovering arguments of things and their traits, but devices for remembering, for amplifying, for describing, and for constructing figures.¹

VI

Two translations of Aristotle's Rhetoric were produced during the thirteenth century, and there were also translations of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Averroës' commentary on the Rhetoric, and Demetrius' De Elucutione. The effect of the Aristotelian rhetoric and its variant interpretations (both Demetrius and Averroës passed as 'Aristotelian') on philosophy may be judged from the fact that these works on rhetoric are frequently found in manuscripts which contain works on morals, politics, or economics, and indeed, specific marks of the Rhetoric can be seen in Aquinas' analysis of the passions.² Yet there are relatively few early commentaries on the work itself: Aegidius Romanus in the thirteenth century, and John of Jandun and John Buridan in the fourteenth century are the only outstanding scholastics to have left such commentaries.³ The old problem of the genus of rhetoric, whether it is a part of civil philosophy or logic, is resolved by Aegidius into the difference between Aristotle (who placed it under dialectic) and Cicero (who made it a part of politics).⁴ The position of this pupil of St Thomas is indeed almost a parody of Bonaventura's doctrine that theology is midway between the practical and speculative sciences, for he locates rhetoric midway between the moral and the rational sciences.⁵ The readjustment is striking illustration of the fashion in which unchanged analyses may in the context of altered philosophies take on contrary significances, for the effort of rhetoricians from Quintilian through the early Middle Ages was to claim consideration of general or indefinite questions or theses and to resist efforts to restrict rhetoric to determinate questions or hypotheses lest rhetoric yield its place and importance as a science to philosophy: the difference between politics and ethics on the one hand and rhetoric on the other, according to Aegidius, consists in the fact that a science is determined by its subject matter and that, whereas politics and ethics have a determinate genus, rhetoric is indeterminate, being concerned with knowledge of certain common notions which bear on moral questions. John Buridan divides all sciences into two kinds, the 'principal' science which deals with the proper things of the places relevant to the choice and disposition of words; a further step is needed to carry it, during the Renaissance, from the figures of speech and the figures of doctrine to the rhetorical consideration of the thoughts of the author and the effects on the audience.

³ The commentaries of Jandun and Buridan are unedited; that of Aegidius was published in 1515 in Venice, but I have been unable to consult a copy.
⁵ Ibid., p. 2. Cf. Expositio in Artem Veterem (Venice, 1507), 2v-3r, where speculative science is divided into principalis (concerned with things) and adminiculativa (the three arts of the trivium).
Rhetoric in the Middle Ages

science, and the 'instrumental' science which is concerned with the mode of statement and teaching. The instrument of the theoretic sciences is logic or dialectic, but in moral science the problem involved concerns not only the doubtful and the true, but also the need to stir desire as it bears on understanding, and a special moral logic or dialectic is required which is divided into two parts, rhetoric and poetic.\(^1\) John of Jandun divides philosophy into non-organic (practical and speculative) and organic, which includes grammar and logic, rhetoric being a subdivision of logic.\(^2\)

The three main lines in which rhetoric developed during the Middle Ages — as they had grown out of philosophic oppositions in antiquity and as they had been continued by mediaeval writers under the compulsion of the circumstances and nature of the problems they treated — are extended through the discussions of the Renaissance, notwithstanding revolt against the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, alike by the weight of tradition and by the exigencies of the problems themselves. The tradition of rhetoric as a part of rational philosophy subordinate to logic had a long and honorable continuation which included Zabarella, Campanella, Varchi, Robertelli, and many others.\(^8\) The tradition in which rhetoric dominated the arts continued into the Renaissance not only in the methods and

\(^1\) Questiones super Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, Prooemium (Paris, 1518), fol. 4r.

\(^2\) Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Tres Libros de Anima, Prohemium (Venice, 1519), fol. 2r.

\(^3\) According to Zabarella (De Natura Logicae ii. 13–23 [Opera Logica, Cologne, 1597, pp. 78–100]) rhetoric and poetic are instruments of civil discipline and parts of logic (the arts of demonstration, dialectic, and sophistic are also parts of logic); like logic they are rational faculties, not verbal like grammar. Logic is divided into two principal kinds, universal and particular; rhetoric and poetic are instances of particular logic. Campanella divided his Philosophia Rationalis into four parts: Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, and Poetic. Rhetoric is a part of rational philosophy deriving its arguments from dialectic and its matter from morals; it does not treat of all questions, but is limited to persuasion and dissuasion of good and evil; poetic has the same function, but it differs from rhetoric in its universality, since it presents all goods and all truths to all audiences (Philosophia Rationalis, Pars Tertia, Rhetorica 1. 1. [Paris, 1538], pp. 1–7; cf. Pars Quarta, Poetica 1. 1. pp. 89–93). B. Varchi follows the traditional division of philosophy into real, active, and rational; rhetoric and poetic are subdivisions of rational philosophy, although strictly speaking poetic is neither an art nor a science, but a faculty; dialectic, rhetoric, and poetic are essentially the same thing, differing only accidentally, and the dialectician, rhetorician, and poet can be put on the same level of nobility and honor; cf. 'Della Poetica in Generale,' Opere di Benedetto Varchi (Trieste, 1859), ii, 684: 'La filosofia razionale, la quale favellando di parole e non di cose, non è veramente parte della filosofia, ma strumento, comprende sotto sé non solo la loica (intendendo per loica la giudiziale) e la dialettica (intendendo per dialettica non tanto la topica, quanto eziandio la sofistica e la tentativa) ma ancora la rettorica, la poetica, la storica e la grammatica.' Robertelli raises the question, not in terms of the form of the art but in terms of its matter and end: poetic shares its matter, oratio, with four other disciplines: demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, and sophistic; grammar is excluded from the list since it does not involve the intellectual content of what is said. The five are easily and rapidly distinguished (In Librum Aristotelis de Arte Poetica [Basel, 1555], p. 1): 'Ex his quaebimet facultas unum arripit genus. Demonstratoria verum. Dialectice probable. Rhetorica suasorium. Sophistice id, quod probabilis, sed verisimilis habet speciem. Poetice falsum, suo fabulosum.' Its end (\textit{ibid.} 2) is the 'imitating word,' as the end of rhetoric is the 'persuading word'; it is (borrowing from Cicero) the imitation of life, the mirror of custom, the image of truth. Cf. H. Cornacchinus, Indagatio Verae et Perfectae Definitionis Logicae, Pars V, cap. 21 (Padua, 1606), p. 247: poetic and rhetoric are parts or offshoots of logic, or rather aggregates composed from logic, grammar, and civil philosophy, and \textit{(ibid.} Pars iv, cap. 10, pp. 220–221) dialectic, sophistic, and rhetoric are midway between grammar and logic.
doctrines of theology but in a secular tradition which took one of two forms: either all philosophy and all subjects are assimilated to rhetoric, as in the doctrines of Majoragius and Nizolius, or the method of discovery is refurbished and transferred from rhetoric to revitalize and revolutionize dialectic, as in the doctrines of Rudolph Agricola and Petrus Ramus. The tradition in which rhetoric had become a discipline of words, independent alike of philosophy and dialectic, finally, established verbal distinctions which grew into doctrines of things: the long and subtle speculations of fourteenth-century philosophers on insolubilia, obligatoria, and sophisms laid the foundations for many of the early theories in physics and mathematics, and symbolic logic, though unconcerned with its past, still repeats the elements of this heritage; the analysis of the figures of the poet was made, without undue or violent alteration, into a theory of poetry which dealt with imagination, passion, truth, and virtue; and political philosophy has never entirely lost the rhetorical turn from which its theories derived their modern concreteness and practicality.

Once the general movements in the arts, of which the variegated history of rhetoric is a symptom, have been set into some intelligible schema, the startling and revolutionary shifts of doctrines and of problems are more easily understood.

1 J. L. Vives (De Causis Corruptarum Artium, Liber IV [Lugduni Batavorum, 1586], p. 239) reports the doctrine of philosophers who distinguish two rhetorics, one universal and applicable to all things, the other particular and suited to civil use; Vives interprets the position as being in opposition to the tendency to make rhetoric part of logic. The position is defended by M. A. Majoragius on the authority of Cicero (De Finibus ii. 6. 17) against Aristotle (Aristotelis Stagiritae De Arte Rhetorica Libri Tres cum M. Antonii Maioragii Commentariis, Liber I [Venice, 1591], p. 2). M. Nizolius holds, again on the authority of Cicero, that philosophy and oratory are not two separate faculties but one and the same art, composed of two arts which are imperfect when separated (De Veris Principis et Vera Ratione Philosophandi contra Pseudophysicps, Liber III, cap. 3 [Parma, 1553], p. 211); he quotes Laurentius Valla, with approval, when he argues that dialectic is a part of rhetoric, since it consists of only one of the five parts of rhetoric, namely discovery (ibid., cap. 5, p. 240); and finally he holds that rhetoric is a general art and science under which are subsumed all other arts and sciences (ibid. III, cap. 8, p. 208). The distinction of the two rhetorics, the rhetoric of precepts and the rhetoric in use, is preserved by Riccoboni, who also adds 'ecclesiastical' as a fourth genus to the traditional three, 'deliberative, 'demonstrative,' and 'judicial' (A. Riccobonus, De Usu Artis Rhetoricæ Aristotelis Commentarii Vigintiquinque, Quibus Duplex, Rhetorica Strictim Explicita, Altera, Quae Præcepta Tradit Persuadendi, Altera, Quae re ipsa persuadet, etc. [Frankfurt, 1595]). The use of rhetoric in refurbishing Scriptural interpretation is well illustrated in the Heptaplus of Pico della Mirandola (in which Moses emerges as the 'Idea' of the writer, the exemplar of the prophet) and John Colet's Enarrationes in Epistolas S. Pauli.

2 Rudolph Agricola undertook to reinstate in dialectic the processes of discovery which had become part of rhetoric because civil philosophy came into prominence in Greece before the maturity of the other arts (De Inventione Dialectica, Liber II, cap. 18 [Cologne, 1538], pp. 538 ff.), and to correct the errors which Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius had committed in treating and classifying the places. The function of rhetoric was limited to ratio dicendi. According to Petrus Ramus logic or dialectic is a general art, the whole art of reason (Scholae in Liberales Artes [Basel, 1569], Scholae Dialecticae, Liber II, cap. 2, pp. 35–37). The parts of dialectic are discovery and judgment (ibid., cap. 8, p. 53); the parts of rhetoric are elocution and action (Scholae Rhetoricae, Liber I, p. 238). The logic of Aristotle abounded in errors, confusions, vain precepts, and alterations: Ramus professed to have supplied the missing virtues, removed the errors, and to have made the art usable. The error of Cicero consisted in transferring all the Aristotelian devices of dialectic to rhetoric and of having made one art of two; and Quintilian mixed rhetoric with all the other arts; Ramus undertook to correct both errors (Rhetoricae Distinctiones in Quintilianum [Paris, 1559], pp. 3–8).
Since the problems of the sciences and the arts are closely related and are often stated in almost identical language, a slight shift of theory or terminology may at a point bring an unsuspected richness from one art into the threadbare terminology of another. The three customary questions of rhetoric, whether it is, what it is, and what sort, merged readily with the questions of logic and influenced early modern attempts to formulate the scientific method. The customary rhetorical inquiry into the duty of the artist, and the matter and end of the art, took on metaphysical generality when it was merged, in the thirteenth century, with the Aristotelian causes by the simple addition of questions of form to what were already questions concerning the efficient, material, and final causes; and metaphysics apart, the four questions contributed to the foundations of philology in the inquiries into the four causes of books with which Aquinas and Bonaventura and other mediaeval writers opened their commentaries. The controversy concerning thesis and hypothesis merged with Plato's dialectical use of hypothesis and Aristotle's differentiation of thesis, hypothesis, and definition, and contributed unsuspected commitments and implications in modern discussions of scientific method. Rhetoric is at most an unusually clear example among the arts and sciences of a tendency which is possible in the history of rhetoric only because it is universal in intellectual disciplines. In application, the art of rhetoric contributed during the period from the fourth to the fourteenth century not only to the methods of speaking and writing well, of composing letters and petitions, sermons and prayers, legal documents and briefs, poetry and prose, but to the canons of interpreting laws and scripture, to the dialectical devices of discovery and proof, to the establishment of the scholastic method which was to come into universal use in philosophy and theology, and finally to the formulation of scientific inquiry which was to separate philosophy from theology. In manner of application, the art of rhetoric was the source both of doctrines which have long since become the property of other sciences (such as the passions, which were considered in handbooks of rhetoric until Descartes proposed a 'scientific' treatment of them different only in details) and of particular devices which have been applied to a variety of subjects (such as to the 'common-places,' which were sometimes techniques for inventing arguments, sometimes means for dilating statements, sometimes methods for discovering things, or to 'definition' or 'order' which may be determined entirely by consideration of the verbal conditions of expression, the psychological requirements of persuasion, or the circumstantial probabilities of fact). In theory of application, the art of rhetoric was now identified with, now distinguished from, the whole or part not only of grammar, logic, and dialectic (which were in turn distinguished from or identified with each other), but also of sophistic and science, of 'civil philosophy,' psychology, law, and literature, and finally of philosophy as such. Yet if rhetoric is defined in terms of a single subject matter — such as style, or literature, or discourse — it has no history during the Middle Ages; the many innovations which are recorded during that period in the arts with which it is related suggest that their histories might profitably be considered without unique attachment to the field in which their advances are celebrated.